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ST. LOUIS
LAW REVIEW
Vol. IX Published by the Undergraduates of the0o. Washington University School of Law No.
WHEN ARE PROVISIONS FOR WIDOW IN WILL IN
LIEU OF HER RIGHT UNDER TEE LAW?*
We will confine our discussion to Missouri cases.
What are the rights of the widow under the laws of
Missouri?
First-Her common law dower and her share of the real
estate and her share of the personal property of the deceased
husband in accordance with Article XV "Dower," in Chapter
I "Administration," Revised Statutes, often called her statu-
tory dower:
Second-Her homestead rights under Section 5857 of
said statutes;
Third-Her absolute property and allowances under Sec-
tions 105, 106 and 107, of said statutes.
It must be remembered that all these rights are vested
in the widow by law beyond the husband's power to deprive
the widow thereof. With reference to most of them he can
by his will force her to elect, but it appears as to some he
cannot.
*By Henry H. Oberschelp of the St. Louis Bar. This paper was read before
a meeting of the St. Louis Association of Trust Department Officers.
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On accoulnt of the differences in the law pertaining to
dower, homestead and the widow's absolute property and
allowances, the cases pertaining to each will be separately
treated.
FIRST-AS TO DOWER.
The common law rule declared by Story, as quoted by
the Supreme Court,1 is as follows:
"If a testator should bequeath property to his wife mani-
festly with the intention of its being in satisfaction of her
dower, it would create a case of election. But such an inten-
tion must be clear and free from ambiguity; and it will not
be inferred from the mere fact of the testator's making a
general disposition of all his property, although he should
give his wife a legacy; for he might intend to give only what
was strictly his own subject to dower. There is no repug-
nancy in such a devise or bequest to her title to dower.
Besides, the right to dower being in itself a clear legal right,
an intent to exclude that right by a voluntary gift ought to
be demonstrated either by express words or by clear and
manifest implication. In order to exclude it, the instrument
itself ought to contain some provision inconsistent with the
operation of such legal right."
The common law rule prevails in Missouri, except as
modified by Section 328 R. S. Mo. 1919, which reads as fol-
lows:
"If any testator shall, by will, pass any real estate to
his wife, such devise shall be in lieu of dower out of the real
estate of her husband whereof he died seized, or in which he
had an interest at the time of his death, unless the testator,
by his will, otherwise declared."
The distinctions made by that statute and the extent of
its modifications of the common law rule will appear in the
discussion of the cases herein.
1. Pemberton v. Pemberton, 29 Mo. 412.
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In one of the earliest cases, Hamilton v. O'Neil,' the
Supreme Court declared said statute related only to devises
of real estate, and the provision made for the wife by the will,
being only the personal estate, she was under no obligation to
renounce that provision, in order to entitle her to dower in
the real estate.
In Halbert v. Halbert3 a bequest of a slave to the widow
did not bar her dower in real estate.
In Pemberton v. Pemberton," the Supreme Court declared
that an inventory and appraisement would have aided by
showing what proportion the personal property bequeathed
to the wife bore to the whole personal estate, and that the
testator having itemized in detail the personalty to the wife,
such enumeration was entirely unnecessary if she was to have
any more than what was enumerated.
In Applegate v. Smith,5 by a will executed in Kentucky,
a testator devised to his wife his whole estate, real, personal
and mixed, "wherever situate." After the date of the will
the testator acquired land in Missouri. Held, that the title
to said land passed to the widow under the will.
In Martien v. Norris,6 the will of the husband contained
a recital that he had purchased a house and lot and caused the
same to be conveyed to his wife, it "to be held by her in lieu
and discharge of her dower in my real estate, and the same
having been accepted by her as such, I do, in this, my last
will and testament, make no further provision for her out of
my real estate." Held, that the deed and will, together or
separately, evidenced no such provision made for the wife
out of the estate of the husband as required a renunciation of
the provisions of the will in order that she might have her
dower in her husband's real estate. The Court said:
3. 19 Mo. 453.
4. 29 Mo. 408.
5. 31 Mo. 166.
6. 91 Mo. 465.
2. 9 Mo. 11.
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"That the testator, by his will, having made no devise of
real estate to his wife, and the bequest of personalty therein
contained being voluntary and unconditional, she was not
required to renounce the provisions of the will, or make an
election, in order to be endowed of the real estate whereof
her husband died seized."
In Young v. Boardman,7 a will providing " family resi-
dence * * * to be retained for her use," vested a life estate
in the widow and put her to election before she could claim
dower. The Court said:
"It is true he devised all of his property to the trustees
and directs a sale thereof for the purposes of the trust; but
at the same time, he says the family residence and furniture
shall be retained for the use of his wife during her life. This
we think vested in her a life estate, and put her to an election
before she could claim dower. The defendants insist on the
authority of Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 648, that the homestead is
exempt from the operation of the will and therefore nothing
was devised to or for the wife. The answer to this is, that a
life estate and homestead exemption are different things.
As shown in that case, a homestead may be lost by abandon-
ment; whilst as to this life estate, the widow would have been
entitled to the income therefrom had she lived and seen fit
to reside elsewhere, and we see no reason why that life estate
was not at her disposal. Again, for aught that is shown, this
family residence is in excess of the homestead exemption both
in quantity and value."
The court has since held that the rights of a widow in
homestead property under the present law will be lost by
remarriage but not by abandonment.
Hall v. Smith." The testator died leaving a widow and
five daughters. To some of the daughters he had conveyed
various pieces of real estate in which his wife did not join,
7. 97 Mo. 181.
8. 103 Mo. 289.
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and she never relinquished her dower in the lands. He left
a will by which he gave his wife a life estate in the home farm,
$2,000 in money and other specific bequests. He provided
that all his daughters share equally in his estate and charged
those to whom he had conveyed real estate with the amounts
at which it had been valued. The Court held that the statute
requiring the widow to elect between dower and a devise
under the will was confined to lands to which he died seized,
that said statute not applying, the common law would deter-
mine whether or not she had to elect, that an examination of
the will showed nothing indicating an intention on the part
of the testator to relieve the land from the right of dower
held therein by the wife, that "dower is a provision made
by the law for the benefit of the wife after the support and
protection of the husband has been lost, and generally at the
time of life when such support is most needed. This provision
the husband evidently intended his wife to reserve."
McKee v. Stuckey.9 There was a homestead consisting
of a house and lot not exceeding two acres, valued at $500,
in the town of Lathrop. This he willed to his wife "for and
during her natural life," and also $1,000, and provided that
if the personalty be not sufficient, then an eighty-acre farm
be sold to pay that sum to her out of the proceeds, which was
done.
"The plaintiff asked the Court to declare that if the
Lathrop property was the homestead of her husband, no real
estate passed by the will to her; that the homestead was hers
by operation of law beyond the power of the husband to
dispose of it by will or otherwise; and that the $1,000 bequest
not being expressed to be in lieu of dower, she was not put
to the election of choosing it or her dower, but was entitled
to both.
"Under the homestead statute the widow had the right
to use and occupation of the homestead during her life and
9. 181 Mo. 719.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
widowhood, but on her remarriage her interest in it would
cease. Under the will she has a life estate in it even if she
should marry again. The statute gave her a determinable
life estate. The will gave her an absolute life estate. She
had her election and chose to take what the will gave her and
she is bound by her 'choice.
"But the plaintiff has also had her full share of the
eighty acres in question.
"The thousand dollar legacy was, according to the first
mention of it in the will, to be paid out of the testator's
personal estate, but in the last clause of the will, as if appre-
hensive that there might not be personalty sufficient to pay
it, the testator authorized the executors to sell this land and
pay his widow the $1,000 out of the proceeds before paying
any part of it to his children to whom he had devised it. The
power of sale was given to the executors primarily for the
widow's benefit, and she has received the full benefit of the
exercise of that power. The sale was not made to the def end-
ant subject to the widow's dower, but absolute except as to
the mortgage which he was required to pay and has since
paid. The widow cannot receive the proceeds of the sale
made under a power given, in part at least, for her benefit,
and then take back from the purchaser the property sold.
That would not be fair dealing and the law would not coun-
tenance it."
The decisions of the Supreme Court in the two appeals in
Orchard v. Store Company ° are very interesting and hard
to reconcile.
The property in question was a twenty-year leasehold.
On the first appeal the Supreme Court declared that at
common law a leasehold, whatever its duration in years, was
personal property, and that it had not been converted into
real estate by the Missouri Statutes as to conveyances of
real estate concerning chattels real, as to the statute of frauds
10. 225 Mo. 414, and 264 Mo. 554.
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concerning leases, as to executions concerning leases for three
years or more and interests in land, as to partition concerning
estates for years, or as to definition of the words "tenements
and hereditaments," but that Section 315 R. S. Mo. 1919,
provides "dower in leasehold estate for a term of twenty
years or more shall be granted and assigned as in real estate"
and that said twenty-year leasehold was an interest in the
real estate within the meaning of Section 328 R. S. Mo., 1919,
and that as the testator had devised real estate to his widow
and did not declare it was not in lieu of dower and she had
not renounced the will within twelve months, she "had no
dower in this leasehold and no interest whatever unless the
lease was disposed of by the will" (1. c. 465) and "if this
leasehold is not disposed of by the will, the widow had no
interest therein and nothing passed to the plaintiff" (1. c.
466).
On the second appeal the Supreme Court declared that
at the new trial it was shown that the leasehold involved in
the action was not mentioned in the will, and then ignoring
its decision on the first appeal, declared that the widow had
a one-third interest in the leasehold, because it was personal
property not included in the will and that she accordingly
was entitled to a child's share therein as her dower in personal
property.
In re Tyler," the will gave the widow an undivided half
share of testator's estate, which she accepted. Held she was
not entitled to quarantine also.
In Sprakes v. Dorrell'2 a husband dying childless, had de-
vised all his real estate and $15,000 in cash, being one-half
of his personal estate, to his wife. Other bequests were made
amounting to about $6,000 of his personal estate. The resi-
due, undisposed of by will, amounted to about $9,000. The
widow claimed one-half of the intestate property. The
11. 40 Mo. App. 378.
12. 151 Mo. App. 173.
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Springfield Court of Appeals held that it was manifest from
a fair construction of all the terms of the will that the testator
intended the bequest to the widow to be in lieu of dower and
of her statutory rights in the personal property, and that she
must make her election, that she cannot claim under the will
and also claim the dower or property as allowed by law.
That decision is justly subject to criticism. It is directly
opposed to the general reasoning in the other cases and is in
direct conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court in the
last appeal in the Orchard case.1 The $9,000 as to which he
died intestate was all personal property, none of it could even
be regarded as being any interest in any real estate. As
to the undisposed of personalty it should be regarded as if
he had made no will and the widow should have had her share
thereof.
In Dobschuez v. McAlevey, 4 the testator gave all his
property, real and personal, to his wife and named her exec-
utrix. As Section 318 applies only to real estate whereof the
husband died seized, it was held the widow could take under
the will and could also claim dower in land which had belonged
to her husband but was sold before his death and in which
her dower had not been relinquished.
In this connection it may be interesting to compare a
widower's rights under the law and the provisions for him
in a wife's will and see how he fares in the courts.
Take for example Mosely v. Bogy.1 5 The first clause of
the will read: "Should I die leaving surviving me my hus-
band and a child or children, then it is my will that my whole
estate, real and personal, be divided between my husband
and children, in the proportion of one-half to my husband
and one-half to my child or children." Held, "that testa-
trix's intention was to devise to her husband a half interest
in fee simple in her entire property, and a half interest in
13. 264 Mo. 554.
14. 213 S. W. 82.
15. 272 Mo. 319.
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fee simple to her children, and not to devise the real estate
subject to the husband's curtesy, even though the will by its
terms does not attempt to dispose of his curtesy. The word
'estate' did not mean the interest she had in the property,
but meant the property itself."
That decision was not consistent with the common law
rule applicable thereto. Section 328 R. S. Mo. 1919 does not
apply to a wife's will nor the widower's curtesy.
Then again, the courts champion the widower's cause as
in Headington v. Woodward,1 where a childless wife willed
her husband half of her estate (exactly what statute allowed
him). Unknown to him, she conveyed some real estate to her
nephews, retaining life interest and requesting the deeds be
not recorded until after her death. Held, that was fraud on
husband's marital right and he was allowed to keep the half
of the property under the will and also recover half of the
property she had conveyed. As he was entitled to half of all,
there was no inconsistency and he was not precluded by pro-
bating the will.
In Lynch v. Jones,17 a widower, whose wife died without
leaving issue or descendants, although a child had been born
to them which died during coverture, if he had renounced the
will, could under the common law have had his curtesy, and
under the statute, also half of the estate. There is no statute
requiring him to elect between the statutory half and curtesy
as requires a widow to take between statutory half and com-
mon law dower. The will gave him a life interest in real estate
and all personalty and appointed him executor. By qualifying
as executor, making final settlement and retaining all the
personalty he elected to take under the will.
In Schuster v. Morton 8 it was declared, there being no
children, under the statute the widower was entitled to one-
16. 214 S. W. 963.
17. 247 S. W. 123.
18. 187 S. W. 2.
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half of the estate absolutely. Under the will he got a life
interest in all the estate with remainder to others. Held, he
could not take under both will and statute and was required
to elect.
SECOND--AS TO HOMESTEAD.
In determining whether the widow must choose between
the will and her statutory right of homestead we must ascer-
tain whether the husband died before or after the Act of 1875,
materially changing the homestead law, went into effect. The
widow's homestead rights are determined as of the death oY
the husband.
Under the previous homestead law the widow got the
same estate as the husband had held, an absolute fee if that
was what he had had, subject only to the rights of occupation
of the minor children during their minority; but his will
could require her to elect, and if she chose her homestead
right she nevertheless could lose it by abandonment, e. g., by
marrying again and going to live with her second husband
elsewhere.
But the Act of 1875 excepted the homestead out of the
laws relating to devises and gave her a life estate coupled
with the right of the minor children therein until each reached
majority, and that life estate was not lost by abandonment.
By the amendment of 1895 her life estate was reduced to
estate during widowhood.
It may be surprising that most of the decisions pertaining
to election between homestead and the provisions of a will
are based on cases where the testator died before the Act
of 1875 and therefore apply only to the old law. We will
consider them first.
In Davidson v. Davis," the husband died in August, 1874.
By his will he gave his widow a different estate in the land
from that which the law gave her. The Court held that the
19. 86 Mo. 440.
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right under the will and that confirmed by the homestead law
were repugnant to each other and that she had to repudiate
one or the other.
In Burgess v. Bowles,2" the husband died in 1872, and the
facts and the opinion of the Court are contained in the
following extract:
"For the purposes of this case, the land must be regarded
as the homestead of deceased. It was within the legal limits
regarding value and extent, and was all the realty he owned.
He left some personal property.
"Defendant, while his widow, took possession of all this
property, had the will probated and paid off a number of his
debts. In so doing she probably intended to act under the
will, but, after her marriage to Mr. Bowles, she claimed the
land by virtue of the homestead law. That is her claim now.
"The law in force when Giles died controls the rights
of these parties. Under it the widow would take the same
estate owned by the deceased in the homestead, his children
being adults when this action was begun. * * *
"Plaintiff's counsel contend that, as defendant acted
under the will, she must be deemed to have elected the estate
thereby created and hence could not take under the homestead
law adversely to that estate.
"Had she received any greater estate (real or personal)
under the will than that which she would otherwise have been
entitled to claim under the homestead and administration
law, it would be necessary to meet and decide that question.
"But the doctrine of election can have no application
where the property received is not greater than the party
would have the right to take under the law without reference
to any will. Plaintiffs did not establish in this case that it
was greater. Without such showing the homestead, the sub-
ject of this action, must be regarded as vested absolutely in
defendant from Giles' death (Wag. Stat., p. 698, Sec. 5), as
20. 99 Mo. 543.
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well as his personal property to the extent defined by the
administration of law then in force. * * *
"If there was no property on which the will would oper-
ate, as against the widow's absolute statutory rights, there
would be no consideration for an election by her and the
reason on which the doctrine of election rests would fail. No
formal renunciation of the will would be necessary in such
case to confirm her title to the property which the law itself
gave her."
In Schorr v. Etling,2' the will was executed in 1861; the
homestead law, the first to be enacted in Missouri, the old law,
was enacted in 1865; the homestead was acquired in 1866 and
was in no wise referred to in the will; the testator died in 1872.
The Court said:
"After a devise of specific real and personal property
and all mixed property to his wife for life, the testator makes
the following disposition of the remainder: 'And after her
death all real, personal and mixed property of whatever she,
the said Regina Schorr, may be possessed of at the time, shall
be equally divided between my next relations and her said
next relations or heirs.' The former part of the will makes
no attempt to dispose of any property except such as is
specifically named, and does not include an after-acquired
homestead. The disposition of the remainder clearly refers
to the property previously disposed of.
"Whatever construction might be put upon the last clause
of the will in regard to property the testator had the right
to dispose of, we do not think an intention appears therein to
deprive the wife of property and rights to after-acquired
property to which she was entitled by operation of a law
thereafter enacted. No such intention could have been in the
mind of the testator. No such intention appears upon the
will. There is no inconsistency between holding the specific
property devised to her under the will and an entirely distinct
21. 124 Mo. 42.
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property under the law. 'The intent to exclude the widov
from her legal right must clearly appear; if it be doubtful, sbe
is not to be excluded.' "
It thus appears the above quoted section (now 328 R. S
Mo. 1919) mddifying the common law rule does not apply to
homestead.
In Ball v. Ballf the facts and decision of the Court are
set forth in the following syllabus thereto:
"The will put all testator's property in the widow, for
her support and the education and maintenance of his children
during minority, and as they arrived at age she and his
brother were to set off to each child 'a reasonable portion' of
the estate 'so that the children shall be made equal' and so
that 'my wife shall have such portion as she will now be
entitled to under the statute of descent and distribution.'
The testator died in 1874, and at that time a homestead to the
value of fifteen hundred dollars vested absolutely in the widow
at the majority of the children, and under the statutes of
descents and distributions then in force, the lands descended
to the children subject to the widow's dower. The widow
continued to occupy the homestead, which consisted of 160
acres and was worth more than $1,500, and after the children
became of age she and her brother-in-law set off to them two
or three hundred acres of detached lands, and they exchanged
deeds with each other therefor. Held, first, that until dower
was assigned, the widow was entitled to remain in and enjoy
the mansion house and the messuages or plantation thereto
belonging without being liable to pay any rent therefor;
second, the widow received nothing more under the will than
she was entitled to receive by law had she not accepted its
provisions, and, hence, was not deprived of her dower or
homestead; third, after dower was assigned, she was entitled,
by operation of law, to homestead in the mansion house and
messuages to the value of $1,500; fourth, by a valid and
22. 165 Mo. 312.
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binding agreement between her and testator's children the
entire mansion house and plantation could have been set off
to her as her homestead regardless of its value, whether in
excess of $1,500 or otherwise; fifth, a conveyance by her to
some of the children of a part of the homestead whole value
was in excess of $1,500, and which had not been enlarged by
valid agreement between her and the heirs, and by such
children to other children, did not affect the rights of the
other children who had no part in such conveyance, since
these grantees were not innocent purchasers; sixth, as the
widow never relinquished her dower in her husband's lands,
she is entitled thereto unless her interest in the homestead
equals or exceeds a lifetime one-third interest therein, in
which case she is not entitled to dower in addition to home-
stead."
As reason for its decision the Court said:
"It thus seems clear that she received nothing more
under the will than she was entitled to receive by law had
she accepted its provisions. Not only this, but there is not
one word said in the will which would indicate an intention
upon the part of the testator to exclude the right of his wife
to homestead in the land upon which he resided at the time
of his death, so that the widow can, we think, claim both the
benefits given her by the law and the will."
In Stoepler v. Silberberg" we quote from the syllabus
as follows:
"Where no steps were taken by the widow to have the
homestead admeasured to her upon the death of her husband
in 1867, and she never asserted homestead in the premises,
but caused the will, which gave her a life estate, to be probated
and accepted appointment as executrix thereunder, and con-
tinually asserted that she had a life estate only, and the value
of the life estate given her exceeded in value her homestead
right, and the property itself largely exceeded the statutory
23. 220 Mo. 258.
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value of the homestead, it will not be held that she took a
homestead under the statute, which upon her death descended
to her heirs."
In Bank v. LooneyA the decision was rendered in 1917,
but the testator died in January, 1875, before the 1875 Act
was passed and went into effect.
The will, among other things, provided:
"I will that all my real estate situated in the County of
Polk, in the State of Missouri, known and described as the
home place on. which I now reside, remain in the possession
and control of my wife, Mary Malica Looney, as long as she
remains my widow."
The Court held that:
"The widow, having accepted the provisions made for
her here out of the real estate of the deceased, and those
provisions being incompatible with the retention by her of
the homestead estate in such land, neither she nor those
claiming under her could thereafter claim such homestead."
We now come to decisions under the homestead Act of
1875.
The first decision was in 1887, Kaes v. Gross.2 5 The
testator died in September, 1879. We quote the following
from the Court's opinion:
"I have purposely refrained from discussing the ques-
tion of the effect of the will on the homestead, and have made
this case turn on the points set forth in the preceding para-
graph. My reasons for doing so are these: I am persuaded
that the will has no bearing on this case. Section 2693,
Revised Statutes, expressly excepts the homestead out of the
laws relating to devises. This exception is in marked contrast
to the provisions respecting dower in real estate; for there,
when the husband, by will, passes any real estate to the wife,
'such devise shall be in lieu of dower out of the real estate
24. 271 Mo. 545.
25. 92 Mo. 647.
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% * * whereof he died seized, * * * unless the testator, by
his will, otherwise declared,' R. S., Sec. 2199. And Section
2200 required the wife, if she refuses to take under the will,
to file her renunciation within twelve months from the probate
of the will. There is no such provision respecting renuncia-
tion or election as to a homestead; and, as already seen, it is
entirely beyond the power of the husband to devise the home-
stead, as much so as by his sole deed to convey or mortgage
the homestead. R. S., Sec. 2689.
"As the law excepts the homestead out of the law of
devises, it is not to be presumed that the husband, in this
case, intended to go counter to express statutory provisions,
and if he did, his will must yield to the will of the legislature.
The very fact, standing alone, that the legislature has made
no provision for election or renunciation regarding a home-
stead, is very strong evidence, indeed; but where this fact
is coupled with the other, already noted, that the homestead
is excepted out of the law of devise, they. form, as I think,
a conclusive argument against the power of the husband, by
his will, to put his wife to her election in regard to her home-
stead. "
In Bogart v. Bogart6 the testator died June 18, 1875,
and he devised to his wife so long as she remained his widow
all his real estate and the rents and profits thereof, and
declared it to be his intention thus to provide for the raising
and educating of his children. The Court held that real
estate passed to his widow within the meaning of Section 4527
R. S. 1889, and that accordingly the widow was not endowed
of said real estate unless she formally denounced said devise.
But the widow's failure to renounce said devise did not de-
prive her of her right of homestead.
The last case, Jenkins v. Jenkins,27 a Kansas City Court
of Appeals case, is anomalous. It held that "although a will
26. 138 Mo. 419.
27. 234 S. W. 365.
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does not give to testator's widow a greater amount of prop-
erty than she would be entitled to by law, and though See. 328
R. S. Mo. 1919, as to devise to her being in lieu of dower, is
not applicable to homestead, yet the will, by its disposition
of the real estate, clearly indicating the intention to exclude
her dower and homestead rights, she, under the doctrine of
election, cannot have her statitory homestead rights; her
acts clearly showing that she accepted the terms of the will."
If the testator in that case died before the Act of 1875,
the decision would appear to be correct. The opinion states
that the land was acquired in 1869 or 1870, and while it does
not state when he died it does say that both he and his wife
were aged persons, and the decision was in 1921. If the
testator died after the Act of 1875 then according to the
previous Supreme Court decisions this last case was wrongly
decided.
THIRD-WIDOW'S ABSOLUTE PROPERTY AND ALLOWANCES UNDER
THE STATUTES.
While the provisions of a will may be construed to be
in lieu of dower in real or personal property, hardly ever has
the language been construed strong enough to make its pro-
visions in lieu of the widow's absolute property and allow-
ances under the statutes, now Sections 105, 106 and 107 R. S.
Mo. 1919.
And even though the will may be so plain and explicit
as to take away the $400 statutory allowance, yet "it is doubt-
ful if a clearly manifested purpose so to do would be effec-
tive" to deprive the widow of her allowance in lieu of one
year's provisions. (Goode J. in Glenn v. Gunn.2 )
In Bryant v. McCune the testator devised and be-
queathed to his wife a large portion of his estate, real and
personal, to hold during her life, and died without issue. The
28. 88 Mo. App. 1. c. 445.
29. 49 Mo. 546.
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Court held that the devise of a life estate in real estate, by
reason of the statutes (now Section 328 R. S. Mo. 1919) pre-
cluded the widow from taking dower in other real estate not
devised, but that said section did not pertain to what the
statutes gave the widow as her absolute property out of the
personal property, which the Court accordingly allowed to
the widow in addition to what she got under the will. The
Court said, "there is no indication in the will that she was
expected to surrender anything, and 'it is an established
principle that a provision in the will of a husband in favor
of the wife will never be construed by implication to be in
lieu of dower or any other interest in his estate given by
law; the design to substitute one for the other must be un-
equivocally expressed.' "
In Hassenritter v. Hassenritter° the testator willed to
his wife one thousand dollars life insurance and "dower in
all real property according to law." Held that did not pre-
clude her from also receiving the $400 as her absolute prop-
erty and an allowance in lieu of provisions under the statutes.
The Court approved the language in Bryant v. McCune
quoted above and added "this is no case for surmises or
presumptions."
In re Klostermann,31 it was held that "it will not be
inferred that the husband intended to bar his widow of her
absolute statutory allowance of $400 from the fact that he
made a general disposition of his property by will, wherein
he bequeathed to her $400. An intent to bar the widow of
this legal right by legacy must clearly appear, at least by
manifest implication from provisions in the will inconsistent
with the legal right."
In Schw atken v. Daudt32 the plaintiff as widow had
applied for an order on the executor to pay her $400 as pro-
vided by the statute. The executor defended on the ground
30. 77 Mo. 162.
31. 6 Mo. App. 314.
32. 53 Mo. App. 1.
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that the provisions of the will were in lieu thereof. The Court
declared "under the will the entire property passed to the
widow to be used and enjoyed by her for her sustenance so
long as she remained a widow, and, if necessary to her sup-
port, the entire property could be sold by her, but, in the
event of marriage, the widow was endowed under the laws of
the State. These provisions are clearly repugnant to the idea
of a present right of dower. If the second clause left the
question in doubt, the third puts it beyond all controversy."
In speaking of that case, Judge Goode in Glenn v. Gunn33
said "that is the only authority in this State, we believe, in
which she was refused the benefit of the statute."
The strong and important differences between the
widow's absolute statutory allowance and dower in personal
property, and the reasons why the courts might be willing to
concede that the language of a will might preclude the
widow's dower in personal property but nevertheless will
insist that her statutory allowance be not precluded are well
set forth in the two masterly opinions of Judge Goode in the
two appeals in Glenn v. Gunn, the first being on the subject
of the $400 absolute property, 84 and the other on the subject
of the widow's absolute allowance in lieu of provisions.3 5
Although the will provided: "I want all of my debts
paid, and it is my express will and wish and decree that my
said wife and my said daughters shall share alike in all my
real and personal property after the paying of all just debts,"
nevertheless the widow was also allowed $400 as her absolute
property under the statute and an allowance in lieu of pro-
visions.
In the first case Judge Goode declared, "a careful study
of the decisions in this State and elsewhere, in which the
deprivation of the statutory bounty by reason of accepting
legacies is discussed, has led us to the conclusion that in most,
33. 88 Mo. App. 1. c. 426.
34. 88 Mo. App. 423.
35. 88 Mo. App. 442.
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if not all, instances, the courts insist on something more ia
the will to bar the widow from claiming the bounty than a
provision that the bequests to her shall be in lieu of dower
Wbile they will deny her dower in personalty when the will
so stipulates, or, when, constructively, its provisions are in-
consistent with the estate, they appear to require as a condi-
tion precedent to denying her the preference given by the
administration law, words of the testator, either unequivocally
providing that she shall be denied it if she accepts the be-
quests or else showing unmistakably that he had that right in
his mind's eye and intended that his provision for her should
supersede it. On no other theory can harmony or consistency
be tortured out of the decisions."
The opinion in the second appeal is very short, but im-
portant, and reads as follows:
"The judgment is right. The will cuts no figure. This
statutory provision for a year's support for the widow and
children does not depend on the husband's testacy or intes-
tacy, solvency or insolvency. It is theirs absolutely-given
to them by the wise and humane sentiments of an enlightened
age, out of compassion for their hapless state when the bread-
winner is lost. Creditors cannot seize nor should bequests
defeat it. The law makes no difference between the indigent
and the opulent in respect to this bounty. The terms of the
will speak no wish to take away this right, and it is doubtful
if a clearly manifested purpose to do so would be effective.
The respondent was entitled to what she asked."
In Ellis v. Ellis"0 the testator undertook to dispose of all
his personal property among his wife and certain legatees,
that to the wife in lieu of dower. It was held that the widow
could take under the will and was also entitled to the $400
absolute personal property under the statute, as that was
not dower.
In Lowe v. Lowe,37 the Court considered a prenuptial
36. 119 Mo. App. 63.
37. 163 Mo. App. 209.
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contract, which for our present purposes is the same as if it
were a will. The party of the second part, who became wife
and then widow, had received property and money under the
contract to the value of $3,800, a little over one-third of her
husband's estate. The Court declared "we believe the con-
tract made reasonable provision for the wife and was fair
and just considering the amount of the husband's estate"
and therefore held it valid as an ante-nuptial contract. The
contract provided "the second party does hereby accept said
provisions for her benefit in full and in lieu of dower in the
property of the first part and of all marital rights in his
property and estate, but she shall be excluded from all marital
rights in the estate of first party, except as above provided."
The Court said, "it will be seen that the language of the ante-
nuptial contract does not expressly bar plaintiff's right to
the statutory provision for one year's support as the widow
of her deceased husband," and concluded "in the absence of
express language to that effect we must presume that the
parties did not intend to include the absolute property of the
wife as one of her marital rights in the property and estate
of the husband."
In Peugh v. MclfinneyU8 the testator by his will gave
widow all household and kitchen furniture (except curios)
and $3,600, "to be the absolute property of my wife," and to
a child by a former wife the entire remainder of estate abso-
lutely subject only to debts, funeral expenses and the said
$3,600. The widow took everything willed her, and also ap-
plied for and was granted allowance in lieu of provisions and
the $400 absolute property. The Court said:
"The wording of the will is not such as to unequivocally
provide that the widow shall be denied the allowances now
sought if she takes under the will; nor does the will show
unmistakably that the testator intended that his bequests to
her should supersede them. It is only by a process of infer-
38. 211 S. W. 83.
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ences or deduction from the result of the testamentary dispo-
sition of his. property that such a conclusion can be reached.
Such is not sufficient to defeat these statutory allowances to
the widow. Remarks of the courts in cases dealing with the
rights of widows to pure dower where they have accepted
under wills * * * are not applicable to their rights to the
statutory allowances here in Ruestion."
It is thus apparent that in considering whether the pro-
visions of a will are in lieu of dower, we must give effect to
every word in the statute, now Section 328 R. S. Mo. 1919,
whether if at all and to what extent it applies. It is also
evident that different reasoning is applied as to homestead
and the widow's absolute property and allowances under the
statute.
While we have felt free to criticise some of the Missouri
decisions, decisions on the subject in other States are much
more confusing and make us well satisfied with our own
Courts.
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